Civil War; The Crisis That Reshaped Nigeria’s History And The Fall Of Biafra.

Civil War; The Crisis That Reshaped Nigeria’s History And The Fall Of Biafra.

 

July 6, 1967, is a significant date in Nigeria’s history. It was the day, the 30 months Nigerian Civil War that led to the death of over three million people started.

Civil War: The crisis that reshaped Nigeria’s history
It is reflections today as Nigeria marks the 50th anniversary of the beginning of the Nigerian Civil War, better known as the Biafran War fought between July 6, 1967 and January 15, 1970. The war was fought between the government of Nigeria and the secessionist state of Biafra.
Biafra represented nationalist aspirations of the Igbo people, whose leadership felt they could no longer coexist with the then Northern-dominated Federal Government. The conflict resulted from political, economic, ethnic, cultural and religious tensions, which preceded Nigeria’s independence from Britain in 1960.
Immediate causes of the war were the 1966 January coup and July counter-coup, and persecution of Igbos living in Northern Nigeria as well as control over oil production in the Niger Delta.
The January 15, 1966 coup, which toppled the First Republic, brought Maj. General Johnson Thomas Umunnakwe Aguiyi-Irons, an Igbo from Ibeku, Umuahia in present-day Abia State of the then Eastern Region to power, while the July 29, 1966 counter-coup that toppled him


led to the emergence of then Lt. Colonel Yakubu Gowon (then Chief of Staff, Nigerian Army), an Ngas from Lur, a small village in the present Kanke Local Government Area of Plateau State in the then Northern Region as Head of State.
The July 1966 military putsch claimed the lives of Ironsi and the then military governor of Western Region, Lt. Colonel Francis Adekunle Fajuyi, among several others. Ironsi was only six months in power. He had seized power in the ensuing chaos following the January coup and was in Ibadan as part of his reconciliation tour after the first coup which saw the killing of mostly prominent Northern politicians and army officers, when he and Fajuyi were arrested and murdered by a group of mutinous soldiers of Northern extraction.
Various accounts have it that the counter coup staged by the Northern military officers had two aims: Revenge on the East, and a break-up of the country. But the wise counsel of dedicated Nigerians, interested and well-disposed foreigners prevailed. The Head of State, Aguiyi Ironsi and many other senior officers of Eastern origin were killed. The lack of planning and the revengeful intentions of the second coup manifested itself in the chaos, confusion and the scale of unnecessary killings of the Easterners throughout the country. Even the authors of the coup could not stem the general lawlessness and disorder, the lootings and killings, which spread through the North like wildfire on September 29, 1966.
Gowon, in a broadcast to the people of the North in September said; “I receive complaints daily that up till now Easterners living in the North are being killed and molested and their property looted. It appears that it is going beyond reason and is now at a point of recklessness and irresponsibility.” Before then, in an effort to stop the killings and to preserve the nation in one form or the other, an ad hoc conference of the representatives of the regions was called on August 9, 1966 in Lagos.
The meeting made the following recommendations: Immediate steps should be taken to post military personnel to barracks within their respective regions of origin; a meeting of this committee or an enlarged body should take place to recommend in a broad outline the form of political association which the country should adopt in the future; immediate steps should be taken to nullify or modify any provisions of any decree which assumes extreme centralization and that the Supreme Commander should make conditions suitable for a meeting of the Supreme Military Council urgently as a further means of lowering tension.
The first recommendation was implemented on August 13, 1966. Troops of Eastern Nigeria origin serving elsewhere in the country were officially and formally released and posted to Enugu, the capital of Eastern Region, while troops of non-Eastern origin in Enugu moved to Kaduna and Lagos. This marked the beginning of division and disunity within the rank and file of the Nigerian Armed Forces.
Most of the civilian of Eastern Region origin, who had never lived in the East and would have continued to live elsewhere in the country lost confidence and moved to the East. Some of them when they arrived at their destination became refugees in their own country.
None of the other recommendations was fully implemented except nullification of the unification decree. With the troops of Eastern Region back in Enugu and the non-Eastern troops withdrawn from there, with Nigerians of non-Eastern origin driven out of the East in their own interest, and with Easterners at home and abroad returning home with news of Nigerian’s brutality against them, and with the oil flowing in the Eastern Region, the way was now open for the implementation of the secession.
The East and the North began a warof words through their radios and newspapers. Early in 1967, a peace negotiating meeting of the Supreme Military Council of the Federal Republic of Nigeria and the Eastern Region Military Governor, Col. Chukwuemeka Odumegwu Ojukwu was called under the auspices of General Ankrah of Ghana in Aburi, Ghana. As it
turned out, all the other members of the council except Ojukwu were either too thrusting, too naive or too ill – prepared for the meeting. Therefore, Ojukwu scored a vital goal in his ambition.
Different versions of what happened in Aburi were released by Ojukwu in the East and by the Federal Military Government in Lagos. While Ojukwu accused the Federal Government of bad faith and going back on promises, the Federal Government accused Ojukwu of distortion and half truths. After several meetings amongst the Federal and Regional officials, what amounted to the demise of the federation was promulgated in Decree No. 8 of March 17 1967 in a desperate effort to implement the Aburi decisions and to avoid further stalemate and possible civil war.

Not surprisingly, Ojukwu completely rejected Decree No. 8 as falling short of full implementation of Aburi decisions. The die was cast. All efforts to intervene by eminent Nigerians and the international community led by General Ankrah, late Emperor Hallie Selassie of Ethiopia and late Dr Martin Luther King proved abortive. `
Ojukwu seized Federal Government’s property and funds in the East. He planned the hijacking of a National commercial aircraft Fokker 27 on a schedule flight from Benin to Lagos. All these and other signs and reports convinced the Federal Military Government of Ojukwu’s intention to secede. Gowon, on the other hand, imposed a total blockade of the East. It was also realised that more stringent action had to be taken to weaken support for Ojukwu and to forestall his secession bid. Short of military action at that time, creation of States by decree was the only weapon ready to hand. The initial plan was to create States in the Eastern Region only. Such action was considered impolitic and fraught with danger. Eventually 12 States were created throughout the country on 27 May 1967.
The Eastern Region was divided into three states. The reaction from Enugu was sharp and quick; the declaration of Eastern Nigeria as the independent sovereign state of Biafra on May 30, 1967. The month of June was used by both sides to prepare for war. Each side increased its military arsenal and moved troops to the border, watching and waiting until the first bullet was fired at the dawn of July 6, 1967 by the federal side. What marked a watershed in Nigeria’s history started.
Gakem: A town’s place in history
Gakem, a town in Bekwarra, in present Cross River State, has a place in history at the place, where the first shots of the civil war were fired in the early hours of July 6, 1967.The town is on the border between Cross River and Benue sates.
The then Federal Military Government, had in its reaction to Ojukwu’s declaration of the Eastern Region as Republic Biafra, ordered the retake of the region back into Nigeria, adopting what it described a “police action.”
To this end, federal troops, on July 6, marched in two divisions into Biafra. Division 1, led by Col. Mohammed Shuwa operated through the north of Biafra, while the second Division advanced on Nsukka.
The Shuwa-led division was led mostly by northern officers. After facing unexpectedly fierce resistance and high casualties, the right-hand Nigerian column advanced on the town of Nsukka which fell on 14 July, while the left-hand column made for Garkem, which was captured on 12 July.
Biafra responded with an offensive of their own when, on August 9, its forces moved west into the Mid-Western Nigerian region, passing through Benin City, until they were stopped at Ore (in present day Ondo State) just over the state boundary on August 21, about 210 kilometres 130 to Lagos, then Nigeria’s capital.
The Biafran offensive was led by Lt. Col. Victor Banjo, a Yoruba, with the Biafran rank of brigadier. The attack met little resistance and the Mid-West was easily taken over. This prompted Gowon to order Col. Murtala Muhammad to form another division (Division 2) to drive the Biafrans out of Mid-West and attack Biafra as well. The region was recaptured by the Nigerian army on the September 20, 1967.

Biafra: May 30, 1967 to January 15, 1970
At the outset Biafra comprised, roughly, the East-Central, South-Eastern, and Rivers states of the Federation of Nigeria, where the Igbo people predominated. The country, which took its name from the Bight of Biafra (an arm of the Atlantic Ocean), was established by Igbos who felt they could not develop-or even survive within Nigeria.
In September 1966, numerous Igbos had been killed in Northern Nigeria, where they had migrated in order to engage in commerce. The secessionist state was led by Lt. Col. Chukumeka Odumegwu Ojukwu and included some non-Igbo persons.
Biafra’s original capital was Enugu; Aba, Umuahia, and Owerri served successively as provisional capitals after Enugu was captured (October 1967) by Nigerian forces.
Seeking to maintain national unity, Nigeria imposed economic sanctions on Biafra from the start of the secession, and fighting between Nigeria and Biafra broke out in July, 1967. After initial Biafran advances, Nigeria attacked Biafra by air, land, and sea and gradually reduced the territory under its control.
The breakaway state had insufficient resources at the start of the war. It was a net importer of food and had little industry and depended heavily on its control of petroleum fields for funds to make purchases abroad. It lost the oil fields in the war, and more than one million of its civilian population reportedly died as a result of severe malnutrition.
At the time of its surrender on January 15, 1970, Biafra was greatly reduced in size, its inhabitants were starving, and its leader, Ojukwu, had fled the country. During its existence Biafra was recognised by only five nations, although other countries gave moral or material support. Civilian groups were organieed in a number of countries to publicise the case for Biafra and to raise funds for the secessionist state.

Role of the international community
World powers – Britain, former Soviet Union, United States and France – played key roles in the war with their support for both sides in the conflict.
For Britain, which planned to maintain and expand supply of cheap high-quality oil from her former colony, the prority was maintenance of oil extraction and refining operations.
The British government backed the federal forces, but when the war broke out, it cautioned them not to damage British oil installations in Biafran. These installations, under the control of Shell-BP Petroleum Development Company (jointly owned by Shell and British Petroleum), controlled 84 per cent of then Nigeria’s 580,000 barrels per day. Two-thirds of this came from the Eastern Region, and another third from the newly created Mid-West Region. Two-fifths of all Nigerian oil ended up in Britain.
Shell-BP therefore considered carefully a request by the Federal Government that it not pay the royalties demanded by Biafra. The British government advised that paying Biafra could undermine the goodwill of the Federal Government. However, the payment was made, resulting in a blockade on oil. Forced to choose a side, Shell-BP and the British government threw in their weight for the Federal Government in Lagos, apparently calculating that this side would be more likely to win the war.
The British High Commissioner in Lagos wrote to the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Affairs on 27 July 1967. His letter read in part: “Ojukwu, even victorious, will not be in a strong position. He will require all the international help and recognition he can get. The Federal Government would be much better placed both internationally and internally. They would have a cast iron case for the severest treatment of a company which has subsidized a rebel, and I feel fairly convinced they would press their case to the lengths of cancelling the Company’s concessions and nationalizing their installations. I conclude, therefore, if the company does change its mind and asks the British Government for advice, the best that could be given is for it to clamber hastily back on the Lagos side of the fence with cheque book at the ready.”
Shell-BP took this advice. It continued to quietly support Nigeria through the rest of the war, in one case advancing a royalty of £5.5 million to fund the purchase of more British weapons. Also, Britain covertly supplied Nigeria with weapons and military intelligence. Supplies provided to the Federal Military Government included vessels and vehicles. After the decision was made to back Nigeria, the British media oriented its reporting to favour the federal side.
The then Soviet Union also backed the Nigerian government, emphasizing the similarity with the Congo situation. It consistently supplied Nigeria with weapons, with the diplomatic disclaimer that they were “strictly for cash on a commercial basis.”
One explanation for Soviet sympathy with the Federal Military Government was a shared opposition to internal secessionist movements. Before the war, the Soviets had seemed sympathetic to the Igbos. But then Soviet Prime Minister Alexei Kosygin stated to their chagrin in October 1967 that “the Soviet people fully understand” Nigeria’s motives and its need “to prevent the country from being dismembered.”
Reportedly, the war substantially improved Soviet-Nigerian diplomatic and trade relations, and Moskvitch cars began to make appearances around Lagos. The USSR also became a competitive importer of Nigerian cacao.

The United States, on its part, officially declared neutrality, with the then U.S. Secretary of State Dean Rusk stating that “America is not in a position to take action as Nigerian is an area under British influence.”

However, it provided military assistance to the Nigeria government. The U.S. saw value in its alliance with Lagos, and sought to protect $800 million (in the assessment of the State Department) worth of private investment.

The U.S. government position, notwithstanding, Senator Ted Kennedy led a movement for relief to the millions dying in Biafra, and on September 9, 1968, presidential candidate, Richard Nixon stated: “Until now, efforts to relieve the Biafra people have been thwarted by the desire of central government of Nigeria to pursue total and unconditional victory and by the fear of the Ibo people that surrender means wholesale atrocities and genocide.

But genocide is what is taking place right now – and starvation is the grim reaper.”

Nigeria, also received support from Egypt, which provided pilots to fly the aircraft procured by the Soviet Union. Biafra appealed unsuccessfully for support from the Organisation of African Unity (OAU, now African Union – AU), whose member states generally did not want to support internal secessionist movements. While the other super powers tilted towards the Federal Military Government, France provided weapons, mercenary fighters and other assistance to Biafra and promoted its cause internationally, describing the situation as a genocide.

However, it did not recognise Biafra diplomatically.

Through Pierre Laureys, France provided two B-26s, Alouette helicopters, and pilots. It also supplied Biafra with captured German and Italian weapons from World War II, sans serial numbers, delivered as part of regular shipments to Côte d’Ivoire.

France also sold Panhard armored vehicles to the Nigerian federal government. French involvement in the war can be viewed in the context of its geopolitical and economic strategies.

Nigeria represented a base of British influence in the predominantly French-aligned area and there was the need to break to establish influence through support for Biafra. Economically, France was significantly incentivized by oil drilling contracts for the Société Anonyme Française de Recherches et d’Exploitation de Pétrolières (SAFRAP).

Humanitarian crisis

Pictures of the famine caused by Nigerian blockade on Biafra attracted sympathy for the secession side worldwide. It was regarded in the Western press as the genocide of two million people, half of them children and fund raising for relief was carried out at the time, with the help of United States Senator Ted Kennedy.

The Biafran government had reported that Nigeria was using hunger and genocide to win the war, and sought aid from the outside world and awareness of the mounting crisis rose in 1968. Information on the suffering in Biafra spread especially through religious networks, beginning with alerts from missionaries.

It did not escape the notice of worldwide Christian organisations that the Biafrans were Christians and Northern Nigerians controlling the federal government were Muslims. Many volunteer bodies organised the Biafran airlift, which provided blockadebreaking relief flights into Biafra, carrying food and drugs.

One of the volunteers was Count Carl Gustaf Ericsson von Rosen, a Swedish pioneer aviator, humanitarian, and mercenary pilot. His flights for the Biafrans were notable for using the small Malmö MFI-9 in a ground attack role. He was assisted by Lynn Garrison, an ex-RCAF fighter pilot.

He introduced the Canadian method of dropping bagged supplies to remote areas without losing the contents.

He showed how one sack of food could be placed inside a larger sack before the supply drop. When the package hit the ground the inner sack would rupture while the outer one kept the contents intact. With this method many tons of food items were dropped to Biafrans, who would otherwise have died of starvation.

Bernard Kouchner was one of a number of French doctors, who volunteered with the French Red Cross to work in hospitals and feeding centres in besieged Biafra. The Red Cross required volunteers to sign an agreement, which was seen by some (like Kouchner and his supporters) as being similar to a gag order, that was designed to maintain the organisation’s neutrality, whatever the circumstances.

Kouchner and the other French doctors signed this agreement. After entering the country, the volunteers, in addition to Biafran health workers and hospitals, were subjected to attacks by the Nigerian Army, and witnessed civilians being murdered and starved by the blockading forces.

Kouchner also witnessed these events, particularly the huge number of starving children, and when he returned to France, he publicly criticised the Nigerian government and the Red Cross for their seemingly complicit behaviour.

With the help of other French doctors, Kouchner put Biafra in the media spotlight and called for an international response to the situation.

These doctors, led by Kouchner, concluded that a new aid organisation was needed that would ignore political/religious boundaries and prioritise the welfare of victims. They formed le Comité de Lutte contre le Génocide au Biafra, which in 1971 became Médecins Sans Frontières (Doctors Without Borders).

The war also brought about a large increase in prominence and funding of non-governmental organizations (NGOs).

On 29 May 1969, Bruce Mayrock, a student at Columbia University, United States, set himself ablaze at the premises of the United Nations Headquarters in New York, to protest the genocide against the nation and people of Biafra. He died of his injuries the following day.

Fall of Biafra

The Nigerian federal forces launched their final offensive against the Biafrans on December 23, 1969 with a major thrust by the 3rd Marine Commando Division the division was commanded by Col. Olusegun Obasanjo, which succeeded in splitting the Biafran enclave into two by the end of the year.

The final Nigerian offensive, named “Operation Tail-Wind,” launched on January 7, 1970 with the 3rd Marine Commando Division attacking, and supported by the 1st Infantry division to the north and the 2nd Infantry division to the south.

The Biafran town of Owerri fell on January 9, and Uli fell on 11 January. Only a few days earlier, Ojukwu had left for exile in Ivory Coast, leaving his deputy Philip Effiong to handle the details of the surrender to General Yakubu Gowon January 13 1970.

The war finally ended a few days later with the Nigerian forces advancing in the remaining Biafran held territories with little opposition. However, the 30 months of strife was without a cost.

The war cost the Igbos a great deal in terms of lives, money and infrastructure. It has been estimated that up to three million people may have died due to the conflict, most from hunger and disease.

The International Committee of the Red Cross in September 1968 estimated 8,000 to 10,000 deaths from starvation each day.

The leader of a Nigerian peace conference delegation said in 1968 that “starvation is a legitimate weapon of war and we have every intention of using it against the rebels.”

This stance is generally considered to reflect the policy of the Nigerian government. The federal troops were also accused of war crimes including deliberate bombing of civilians and violation of women and children.

After the war Gowon said: “The tragic chapter of violence is just ended. We are at the dawn of national reconciliation. Once again we have an opportunity to build a new nation.

My dear compatriots, we must pay homage to the fallen, to the heroes who have made the supreme sacrifice that we may be able to build a nation, great in justice, fair trade, and industry.”

No doubt, the war had come and gone, but it seems that no lessons were learnt by both sides in the conflict as history tends to repeat itself given the tension over renewed agitation for the state of Biafra by some youths in the South-East and the October 1, deadline given to Igbos living in the North to leave the region by some Arewa youths.

FELIX NWANERI reports.